



GROUP LIBEL STATUTE HELD NO
INFRINGEMENT ON FREEDOM
OF SPEECH
Petitioner published and caused to be distributed on the streets of
Chicago a protest, in the form of a petition to the Mayor, in which he
decried the mongrelization of the white race by the constant encroachment
of negroes into white neighborhoods. Contained in the protest was a plea
that if persuasion will not unite the white race then the "rapes, robberies,
knives, guns, and marijuana of the negro SURELY WILL." 1 He was in-
dicted and convicted under an Illinois statute which prohibited the por-
trayal of "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of
citizens of any race, color, creed or religion." 2 The Supreme Court of
Illinois upheld the conviction.8 The United States Supreme Court affirmed,
5-4, the conviction against the contention that it constituted an abridg-
ment of the freedom of speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
After declaring that libel has never been protected by the Constitution the
Court found a reasonable basis for the legislative judgment in the violent
history of race relations in the State of Illinois. Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952). 4
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech has never been
conceived of as an absolute license to speak or write as one pleases.5 Thus
a state may legitimately impose serious restraints on certain speech in order
to protect its own interests or the interests of its citizens. The area in
which the legislature is given the greatest freedom, and that into which
the Court now casts group libel, concerns speech which has never been
considered to raise any constitutional question. "These include the lewd
1. For a full reproduction of the leaflet see instant case at 276. Other anti-
negro activities of the present petitioner are discussed in FoREsTER & EPSTEIN, THE
TROUBLEMAKERS 150-58 (1952).
2. "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture,
sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in
this state any lithograph,, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication
or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class
of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition
exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or
obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots .. " Iu. ANN.
STAT. c. 38, § 471 (Smith-Hurd 1934).
3. People v. Beauharnais, 408 Ill. 512, 97 N.E.2d 343 (1951). The franchise
of the White Circle League of America, the corporation through which petitioner
carried on his activities, was subsequently revoked by quo warranto proceedings.
People v. The White Circle League of America, 408 Ill. 564, 97 N.E.2d 811 (1951).
4. Justices Black, Reed, Douglas and Jackson dissented.
5. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 n.2 (1942).
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and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words . . ." and are punishable because their very utterance inflicts
injury on the hearer or the defamed or presents a high probability of
causing a breach of the peace and because such language is of very slight
social value and has no part in the exposition of ideas.7 Statutes aimed
at this type of speech will be sustained unless they are clearly unreasonable
or fail to provide an adequate standard to guide a court.8 Aside from this
category, speech properly may be restrained only when it presents a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil. 9 Here, as in the previous area;
the possibility of a breach of the peace may provide justification for the
ban.10 The clear and present danger test, however, seems to apply when
the state seeks to limit the espousal of dangerous or unpopular ideas or to
regulate public discussion on controversial matters. Words that "stir the
public to anger, invite dispute, bring about a condition of unrest, or create
a disturbance" are not necessarily of this nature.1 It is only when a
speaker surpasses the bounds of persuasion and argument and undertakes
to incite riot that he exposes himself to constitutionally valid criminal
punishment.' 2 Aside from these generalities little can be said as to the
meaning of the clear and present danger test. Recently in the Dennis case
several Justices indicated that' it is little more than a rubric under which
the C6urt makes an independent judgment as to whether the invasion of
free speech is justified by the gravity and probability of the evil.18 The
majority in the instant case specifically rejected this careful weighing of
factors 14 in favor of a test of reasonableness under which a statute is sus-
tained unless it is a "willful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the
peace and well-being of the State." -1 This choice is consistent with prior
6. Id. at 572.
7. Ibid.
8. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
9. E.g., Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
10. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
11. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (Vinson, C.J.; Frankfurter,
J.; Jackson, J.; Burton, J. dissenting).
12. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (Black, Douglas, Minton, JJ.
dissenting).
13. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (Vinson, C.J.; Reed,
J.; Burton, J.; Minton, J.). In the same case Justice Fiankfurter quoted FREUND,
ON UNDFRSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27-28 (1949): "'The truth is that the
clear-and-present danger test is an oversimplified judgment unless it takes account
also of a number of other factors: the relative seriousness of the danger in com-
parison with the value of the occasion for speech or political activity; the avail-
ability of more moderate controls than those which the state has imposed; and per-
haps the specific intent with which the speech or activity is launched. No matter
how rapidly we utter the phrase "clear and present danger," or how closely we
hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for the weighing of values. They
tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what is most certain is the complexity
of the strands in the web of freedoms which the judge must disentangle.'" Dennis
v. United States, mipra at 542-43.
14. Instant case at 266.
15. Instant case at 258.
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authority only if group libel is more readily classed with obscenity and
"fighting words" than with legitimate public discussion that merely incites
acrimony.
The initial problem in judicial consideration of any statute that seeks
to limit speech is whether or not the statute on which the charge is based
is so broad "as to permit within the scope of its language the punishment
of incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech." 16
Several recent cases have overthrown statutes on this point of vagueness
either because the words were so broad as possibly to include legitimate
speech or because the words were not readily definable.17 The language
of the instant statute purports to punish writings that portray a "lack of
virtue of a class of citizens . . . which . . exposes [them to] derision
or obloquy." 18 One may question whether the word "virtue" is any more
capable of definition than the word "sacrilegious" which was found objec-
tionable one month after the present decision.?9 The majority disposes
of this problem by saying that the statute has been limited by the state
court to criminally libelous words punishable because of their tendency
to cause breaches of the peace.2 But, the Illinois Supreme Court merely
characterized the words of the present writing as likely to cause violence
and disorder and apparently was not speaking of the statutory language.2 '
Moreover, this narrow interpretation seems to be in derogation of the
statute which reads "or" rather than "and" a tendency to breach the
peace.
22
For its principal substantive authority the majority relies on Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire 23 which also involved a broad statute 24 refined
by state court decision. There the New Hampshire Supreme Court had
described the prohibited language as face-to-face utterances plainly likely
to cause a breach of the peace by the hearer, i.e., "fighting words." 25
Even assuming that the Illinois statute has been limited, the present opinion
apparently expands the "fighting words" test to include written material
16. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948). See also, dissent of Jus-
tice Reed, instant case at 280.
17. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948).
18. See dissent of Justice Reed, instant case at 281.
19. See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
20. Instant case at 254.
21. "A mere reading of the libelous publication in question here refers to Negroes
as a class possessing various criminal tendencies, unchastity, and degrading sexual
inclinations, all of which are 'fighting words' liable to cause violence and disorder be-
tween the races." People v. Beauharnais, 408 Ill. 512, 517, 97 N.E.2d 343, 346
(1951).
22. See text of statute, supra note 2.
23. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
24. "No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any
other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any
offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and
hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing
his lawful business or occupation." Id. at 569.
25. Id. at 573.
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defaming a large group none of whom need be present when the publica-
tion is made.
At its narrowest this holding recognizes a class of written speech that
the legislature may reasonably find has a tendency to cause breaches of the
peace.2 6  The defense to punishment of such speech is a combination of
truth plus good motive.2 7  Recognizing these as the traditional elements
of criminal libel, the majority first demonstrates that an individual tends
to be identified with his class or group and then concludes that group
defamation is in the same category as individual libel.28 The problem
thus raised is whether the attributes of group defamation warrant this
joinder. Critics of group libel laws condemn them as dangerous restric-
tions on the free expression of opinion because utterances concerning
groups bear a far closer relationship to legitimate public discussion than does
speech aimed at an individual. 29  The principal fear is that matters that
ought to be debated publicly may be kept under cover through fear of the
criminal law.30 It may be assumed that the element of malice, or absence
of good intent, tends to distinguish group defamation from ordinary dis-
cussion and to bring it within the class of obscenity and fighting words.
But an immediate difficulty is that someone must decide the issue and it
may often be hard to separate bad motive from distasteful views. A more
important consideration, however, is that the present decision does not
require that the question of motive be placed in issue. If truth plus good
motive may be made a defense, a legislature could conceivably lighten the
defendant's burden by requiring only truth. Utterances concerning groups
are by nature generalities on subjects of public controversy and in all like-
lihood contain some element of truth. If the sufficiency of this element is to
be determined by a jury, with the average prejudices of the community,
the definition of truth may become an expression of what the majority
thinks concerning the particular group 31 This possibility is not nearly
so great in an individual libel case where the triers of fact are less likely
to have a pre-conceived opinion of the defamed person. Thus, although
group defamation may have certain characteristics of traditional criminal
libel, its peculiar connection to public discussion seems to justify a test
26. The majority by footnote recognizes that in some states injury to reputation
".. and not tendency to breach the peace, is the gravemen of the offense [criminal
libel]." Instant case at 254 n.3.
27. Instant case at 254.
28. Instant case at 262-63.
29. 1 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 122-25 (1947);
FRAENxEEL, OUR CIVIL LimwrEs 18 (1944). The Court itself indicates a concern
lest the statute be applied to discussion of political groups. Instant case at 263. It
falls to consider that not infrequenly racial and religious groups are, and act as,
coherent political forces.
30. 1 CHIAFE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 123.
31. For a discussion of the problems raised by having a jury decide questions
of truth and good motive see Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 298-301
(1950).
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more liberal than the one applied here.32 In the past the Court has recog-
nized that vilification may sometimes be resorted to by those who engage
in public controversy and yet it felt that the Constitution permitted such
abuse until the clear and present danger arose.33 The instant case appar-
ently retreats from this view, thereby opening to majority groups a path
by which views distasteful to them may be suppressed 8 4
Constitutional Law-
SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR AFTER
ACQUITTAL ABOLISHED IN PENNSYLVANIA
Defendant was acquitted by a jury of charges of assault and battery
and resisting arrest. Although there was no evidence that the defendant
had a previous criminal record or had a reputation of being a dangerous
character, the trial judge nevertheless ordered that defendant be held on
$1,000 bond to maintain good behavior for two years. On a rule to
show cause why the bond should not be quashed, the lower court held
that the practice of requiring security for good behavior after acquittal
was a violation of due process, and that the authorizing statute was void
for vagueness and an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to
the judiciary. The Superior Court, one judge dissenting, affirmed on the
opinion of the court below. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 172 Pa. Super.
152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952).
The power of justices in Pennsylvania to require security for good
behavior was derived from an English statute of 1360.1 While other states
32. The majority purports to limit the present holding by stating that: "'While
this Court sits' it retains and exercises authority to nullify action which encroaches
on freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel." Instant case at 263-64.
33. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940). The only other court
to consider a group libel statute declared it unconstitutional, stating inter alia: "To
denounce one's fellows or advocate hostility to them, or to a group, because their
origin began in a north country or a south country or because of creed or color is as
revolting to any fair-minded man as it is absurd and unjust to the mind of a thoughtful
man; but nevertheless to make the speaker amenable to the criminal law for his
utterances they must be such as to create a 'clear and present danger that will bring
about the substantive evils' to society . . . that the state has the right to prevent."
State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395, 403, 22 A.2d 877, 882 (1941). In this case,
which concerned an anti-Semitic publication, the American Jewish Committee and
the American Jewish Congress intervened as friends of the court and urged release
without trial. 1 CHAFEE, op. cit. mtpra note 29, at 123.
34. The case of Bevins v. Prindale, 39 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Ill. 1941), indicates
that the instant statute has been used as a weapon for harassment of the Jehovah's
Witnesses, who were conducting their annual anti-clerical campaign. Tanenhaus,
Group Libel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 279 (1950). This same religious sect was involved
in the Cantwell case.
1. 34 Enw. III, c. 1 (1360), incorporated into Pennsylvania law by Report of
Judges, 3 Binn. 599, 612 (Pa. 1808). It pertinently provides: ". . . they [con-
servators of the peace] shall have power . . . to take of all them that be not
of good fame, where they shall be found, sufficient surety and mainprize of their good
behaviour towards the king and his people . . . to the intent that the people be not
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have specifically enacted statutes giving the power to require bonds for
good behavior after conviction in addition to the usual punishment,2 none
but Pennsylvania either in statute or common law has ever authorized the
exercise of this power after acquittal.3 As to the authoritative basis for
the Pennsylvania rule, the English act 4 makes no specific mention of the
power to bind for good behavior after acquittal, and the ancient text and
case authority supposedly forming the basis of the doctrine is extremely
weak.5 Respublica v. Donagan, in which defendants, after being acquitted
as accessories to murder, were jailed for failure to post a $10,000 14 year
bond, was the first Pennsylvania case to condone the power to bind after
acquittal,0 and its use was subsequently approved in two later cases.
7
by such rioters or rebels troubled or endamaged, nor the peace blemished, nor
merchants nor others passing by the highways of the realm disturbed, nor put in
the peril which mbay happen of such offenders." RoBERTS, DIGEST OF SaLzcr BarrlsH
STATT S 349-50 (2d ed. 1847). Justices of the peace, magistrates, and judges are
accorded all the common law powers of conservators or justices of the peace and
would thus appear to be empowered to use this statute. PA. CoNsT. Art. V, §9;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 1058 (Purdon 1930).
2. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 62, § 1504 (Corrick 1949) (conviction of any
offense) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 242.410 (1948) (conviction of violation of local option
liquor law); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 2596 (1942) (conviction of a crime less than a
felony).
3. Note, 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 331, 332, 339-40 (1940). For an instance of a
refusal to order security for good behavior after acquittal see United States v.
Venable, 28 Fed. Cas. 368, No. 16,616 (D.C. Cir. 1807).
4. See note 1 supra. See also 2 GABBETT, CRIMINAL LAw 121 (1843) and Com-
monwealth v. Duane, 1 Binn. 98 n. (Pa. 1806) for the history of the act and its
foundation in the disorder resulting from the return of disbanded English soldiers.
5. The power was apparently most commonly based on the authority of 2
HAWKINS, PLEas OF THE Caowyr 623 (8th ed., Curwood, 1824) : "Also there are in-
stances where defendants acquitted against plain evidence, of felonies and other
enormous crimes, have been bound to their good behaviour." However, as the court
in the instant case points out at 166-67, 92 A.2d at 280, two of his cited cases are
irrelevant and the third was decided by an equally divided court. In 2 St. Tr. 60
it is apparent from Hawkins' note that the commitment was for contempt of court
during the trial; and the court similarly interprets Evans and Cottington's Case,
Cro. Car. 506, 79 Eng. Rep. 1037 (K.B. 1639), which may be questionable in view
of the court's flat statement that "the three which were acquitted, against whom
was such probable evidence, were bound to find sureties for their good behaviour."
Hopestill Tyndal's Case, Cro. Car. 291, 79 Eng. Rep. 855 (K.B. 1633), probably
the first reported case requiring bond for good behavior after acquittal, was decided
by a divided court. Hawkins failed to mention Rex v. Sir John Knight, Comberbach
40, 90 Eng. Rep. 331 (K.B. 1687), the only case squarely supporting his statement.
Toplin's Case, Latch 5, 82 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B. 1662) may also support the power
to bind after acquittal. No American jurisdiction except Pennsylvania has adopted
this interpretation. Instant case at 165, 195, 92 A.2d at 279, 293.
6. 2 Yeates 437 (Pa. 1799). Some statements in the report are especially in-
teresting: "There was strong reason to believe that the prisoners had been concerned
in a most horrid murder, though there was not sufficient evidence to convict them
of the crime. The court directed them to give the above security, under the firm
opinion, that they were persons of most dangerous character, and not being able to
give the security, they had remained in gaol. . . . Unsafe would the community be,
if such characters could prowl at large through the country, without a sufficient tie
on them. . . . The prisoners afterwards broke gaol and escaped."
7. Bamber v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. 339 (1849) ($5,000 bond required after
acquittal of burglary; the court said: "The practice has existed ever since I came
to the bar. . . . I never heard it doubted.") ; Commonwealth v. Foster, 28 Pa.
Super. 400, 403 (1905) (dictum). The practice was also discussed in United States
ex rel. Hanson v. Mills, 21 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Pa. 1937) ($25,000 bond for ten
years required after acquittal of larceny; habeas corpus would not lie in the federal
court because of failure to exhaust state remedies).
1953]
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But other Pennsylvania cases, although not directly on the point of re-
quiring security after acquittal, have expressed caution in view of the many
possibilities of abuse, especially because of the lack of a jury trial.8 These
decisions provided a convenient doctrinal bridge to the repudiation of the
practice in the instant case.
The bond for good behavior, which is exercisable at the justice's dis-
cretion,9 must be distinguished from the bond to keep the peace, which
is exercisable by the justice only at the instance of a threatened third
party l or if the defendant commits an affray in the justice's presence.'1
The procedures of the latter are specifically prescribed by statute in Penn-
sylvania,' 2 as in many other jurisdictions.13 The Pennsylvania statute
provides for a hearing, requires evidence both of actual danger to the body
or estate of the prosecuting third party and that the threats were made
by defendant maliciously with intent to do harm, makes it the duty of the
justice to suggest a compromise of the parties' differences, and provides for
binding the defendant only until the next term of court. 14 There are no
such procedural safeguards encompassing the power to bind for good be-
havior, nor is there any limit on either the duration or amount of the bond.' 5
The need for safeguards lies in the threat to personal liberty involved in
the power of the justice to imprison for default if the bond is required and
not given.16 A survey of the commitments for default in Philadelphia
County, where the practice had become extremely prevalent, 17 showed 407
such commitments on bonds required after acquittal for the period 1940 to
1948 alone.' 8 This threat, of course, becomes most onerous when the de-
fendant is too poor either to give a bond or to afford an appeal from
the court's decision. 19 In view of this infringement on liberty and the lack
8. See Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 Yeates 93, 100 (Pa. 1800) ; Commonwealth v.
Duane, 1 Binn. 98 n. (Pa. 1806); Commonwealth v. Keeper of the Prison, 1 Ashm.
140, 148 (Pa. C.P. 1831). For a similar exhortation by a text-writer see 5 BURN,
JusTIcE OF THE PEACE 762 (30th ed., Maule, 1869).
9. 34 EDw. III, c. 1 (1360) ; 4 B. Comm. *256.
10. 4 BL. Comm. *255; for a striking illustration of this power see Regina v.
Dunn, 12 A. & E. 599, 113 Eng. Rep. 939 (Q.B. 1840).
11. 4 BL. Comm. *254.
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 23-28 (Purdon 1930).
13. Note, 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 331, 332 (1940).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 23-28 (Purdon 1930).
15. Respublica v. Donagan, 2 Yeates 437 (Pa. 1799). As to the amount of the
bond, see note 18 infrca.
16. 2 GABBETT, CRIMINAL LAW 112 (1843).
17. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT OF LisLATnIVE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE AD-
MINISTRATON OF CRIMINAL JUSTIcE 57 (1938).
18. This information was gleaned from PHILADELPHIA COUNTY PRISON, BOARD
OF INSPECTORS, ANNUAL REPORTS for the years 1940 through 1948. These reports
also indicated (1) that there was no close relationship between the crime charged
and the size of the bond, and (2) that the size of the bond had no close relationship
to the length of imprisonment ordered in its stead, the court, however, usually im-
posing a one-year term. See, e.g., the 1941 REPORT at 19-20.
19. See note 17 supra.
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of even those safeguards provided for security to keep the peace,20 the
court's holding in the instant case that the practice is inherently wrong and
a violation of due process cannot be disputed.21  Nor, in view of the ob-
viously vague realm encompassed by the phrase "not of good fame," can
the court be questioned in its view that this vagueness renders the classifica-
tion unconstitutional and invalidly delegates legislative power to the
judiciary.22  But the most overpowering objection to the practice is that it
effectually negatives the function of the jury, the judge exercising this
power when he considers the jury verdict in error.2 "To the jury belongs
the power to err, not only in gullibility but also deliberately," 24 and if the
jury system be wrong, it should be corrected by frontal attack rather than
by this indirect, harsh and arbitrary method.
Constitutional Law-
SPECIAL OCCUPATIONAL TAX ON GAMBLERS
SUSTAINED DESPITE REGULATORY EFFECT
Criminal proceedings were instituted against defendant for willfully
failing to register for 1 and failing to pay the special occupational tax re-
quired by the gamblers' tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Act of
1951.2 He filed a motion to dismiss the information on the grounds that
20. Some peace bond procedures have been thought to violate due process. Note
the warning of a United States attorney to Philadelphia magistrates to stop jailing
persons who violate peace bonds, since the Justice Department considers such com-
mitments a deprivation of constitutional rights. The Evening Bulletin, Philadelphia,
March 8, 1953, p. 17, col. 4. For a detailed discussion of the lack of safeguards in
all bond cases see Note, 88 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 331, 336-347 (1940).
21. The Pennsylvania Commission to Investigate the Administration of Criminal
Justice stated in its 1938 RE'ORT, op. cit. supra note 17, at 57, that "it is the conclu-
sion of many eminent jurists, lawyers, and scholars, that such procedure is clearly
unconstitutional and a flagrant and dangerous abuse of judicial power."
22. On the problem of vagueness see, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1938) and Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229 (1900) ; as to invalid delega-
tion see, e.g., Kellerman v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. Super. 569, 13 A.2d 84 (1939),
and In re Opinion of Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932).
23. See note 6 srupra.
24. Instant case at 193, 92 A.2d at 292.
1. In a petition for rehearing denied by the Court, 21 U.S.L. W= 3260 (U.S.
April 7, 1953), counsel for defendant contends that this count of the information
does not charge a criminal offense. 65 STAT. 530 (1951), 26 U.S.C. §3291 (Supp.
1952) provides that each person subject to the special tax shall register, and § 3294
prescribes penalties for failure to pay the tax and for failure to post or exhibit the
stamp, but neither mentions failure to register. 53 STAT. 290 (1939), 26 U.S.C.
§ 2707 (1946) dealing with willful violations also does not mention registering, al-
though it does apply to failure to supply information. This legislative oversight may
make collection of the tax difficult unless remedied, since the government relies on
these returns for the source of names of subordinate gamblers.
2. "A special tax of $50 a year shall be paid by each person who is liable for
tax under subchapter A or who is engaged in receiving wagers for or on behalf of
any person so liable." 65 STAT. 530 (1951), 26 U.S.C. § 3290 (Supp. 1952). Sub-
chapter A levies a 10% excise tax on all wagers received by one in the business of
accepting wagers or who conducts a lottery. 65 STAT. 529 (1951), 26 U.S.C.
§3285(d) (Supp. 1952).
1953]
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the law is an unconstitutional attempt to regulate in the guise of a tax, and
that the information he was required to disclose in applying for the stamp 3
would force him to incriminate himself. The district court held the law
unconstitutional as an infringement of the state police powers.4  The Su-
preme Court on direct appeal 6 reversed the lower court on the ground that
the measure was a legitimate exercise of the federal taxing power, despite
its regulatory effect, and dismissed defendant's contention that the informa-
tion required in the application is a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 6
United States v. Kahriger, 73 Sup. Ct. 510 (1953).
Few tax-labelled measures have ever been invalidated by the Supreme
Court, despite their subject, the weight of the tax, or their regulatory
effect. Thus, taxes have been sustained where levied on notes issued by
3. Any person liable for the special tax is required to register with the collector
of the district: (1) his name and place of residence; (2) his place of business and
the name and place of residence of each of his gambling employees or his employer.
It further provides that, "In accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary, the collector may require from time to time such supplemental information from
any person required to register under this section as may be needful to the enforce-
ment of this chapter." 65 STAT. 530 (1951), 26 U.S.C. §3291 (Supp. 1952).
4. United States v. Kahriger, 105 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
5. 34 STAT. 1246 (1907), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. 1952) permits
direct appeal from a decision dismissing an information because of the invalidity
of the statute upon which it is grounded.
6. The question of the self-incriminatory nature of the measure was dismissed by
the majority with the holding that the information required from applicants for the
stamp does not force them to disclose that they had in the past been engaged in
illegal gambling activities, but merely discloses an intent to carry on such an occupa-
tion in the future. Since the excise tax is levied only on a person who is engaged in
the business of accepting wagers, 65 STAT. 529 (1951), 26 U.S.C. § 3285(d) (Supp.
1952), and since the department regulations point out that the tax does not attach
until a person engages in the business or accepts a wager, 26 CoDB FED. REGs.
§ 325.25 (Supp. 1952), it would seem that the purchase of a stamp is at least prima
facie evidence of being in the gambling business. The list of persons liable for the
special tax is open for public inspection and is available to local law enforcement
officials. 53 STAT. 395 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 3275 (1946). The majority implies
that a gambler is not forced to incriminate himself since he may always quit the
business, rather than register.
But anyone who did engage in the gambling business subsequent to the effective
date of the tax will either be guilty of evading the tax or will be forced to disclose
that he is engaging in an illegal business.
Even positing that the stamp disloses past activity, there remains a doubt whether
Fifth Amendment protection extends this far. In United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S.
141 (1931), the Court decided that the federal government could require a defendant
charged with violating a federal law (income tax evasion) to answer questions
which might incriminate him of violation of state laws. But the dictum indicated
that this was true because the disclosure of state law violations was purely incidental
to an investigation "under federal law in respect of federal matters." Id. at 149. In
recent cases where the federal investigation involved matters of state concern, an
investigation of local crime by the Kefauver Committee on Interstate Crime, a dis-
trict court has used the Murdock dictum to sustain the defendants' plea of privilege.
United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952); United States v.
Licavoli, 102 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Ohio 1952); and United States v. Aiuppa, 102
F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ohio 1952). This development exhibits a tendency, noted in
other recent decisions, to limit the Murdock doctrine in order to extend the consti-
tutional safeguard. See United States v. Greenberg, 343 U.S. 918 (1952) ; Hoffman
v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); I. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332
(1951) ; P. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950) (liberal constructions of
circumstances representing danger to witnesses) ; Healey v. United States, 186 F.2d
164 (9th Cir. 1950) (witnesses permitted to remain silent despite offer of immunity
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state banks; 7 on lotteries, many of which were illegal under state law; 8
on sale of oleomargerine; 9 on transfer of narcotics; -o on sale of certain
types of firearms; " and on transfers of marihuana.' 2 On the other hand,
a few such acts have been disapproved by the Court when they have dis-
closed regulatory provisions extraneous to any tax need,13 a detailed scheme
of administration enforced by the nominal tax,' 4 or a penal purpose.1 5 In
the instant case the Court concluded that Congress can tax the business
involved even though it is not within Congress' regulatory power. It recog-
nized 1 that a different question was presented by those regulatory tax
cases where Congress possessed the power to legislate as to the subject
matter of the impositions,17 but it reasoned that Congress can discourage
businesses inimical to the public welfare by means of a heavy tax, and that
the remedy for excessive taxation lies in Congress, not the Court. It also
decided that the mere fact that the revenue collected is negligible does not
invalidate a tax measure with regulatory effect.
The attack here was not on the ground of the tax's excessive weight,
but on the premise that the true purpose was to regulate, not to obtain an
enforced contribution for the support of government. The lower court
had held that such a regulatory purpose was disclosed by the information
required from applicants for the stamp.' 8 Such a purpose is also indicated
by United States Attorney); Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.
1952) (urging that Fifth Amendment be extended to include fear of state crimes).
As the majority in the instant case points out, the appellee cannot claim the privilege,
having failed to register for the tax. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
Perhaps the question could be better presented if an applicant for the stamp should
claim the privilege directly on the application. Cf. United States v. Forrester, 105
F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ga. 1952).
7. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U.S. 1869).
8. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 (U.S. 1866).
9. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
10. United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), and Nigro v. United States,
276 U.S. 332 (1928).
11. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
12. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
13. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) ; see Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U.S.
475 (1926), and Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
14. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1936) ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
15. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); United States v.
LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) ; Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922); cf. Helwig
v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 (1903).
16. Instant case at 514 rn6.
17. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, suPra note 7, depends partly on the alternative ground
of the federal monetary power. McCray v. United States, mtpra note 9, could reach
the same conclusion through extension of the power of Congress to regulate goods
vhich enter into or affect interstate commerce. Traffic in narcotics and marihuana
taxed in United States v. Doremus, Nigro v. United States, .rupra note 10, and
United States v. Sanchez, supra note 12, could perhaps be regulated under the treaty
power of the United States, a signatory of the International Opium Convention, 38
STAT. 1912 et seq. (1912).
18. 105 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
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by the legislative history of the act,1' which the Court does not consider
controlling. 20 Also, the revenue collected since the effective date of the act
not only was far below Congressional estimates,21 but actually amounted
to a net deficit when the cost of collection is considered.
2
The Court distinguishes and limits United States v. Constantine,
2 3
which decided that any tax whose imposition is conditioned on the commis-
sion of a crime constitutes an invalid attempt to penalize activities not within
the regulatory power of Congress. The statute involved in that case im-
posed a $1000 tax on anyone dealing in liquor in a manner prohibited by
state law, while the tax on those who dealt legally was only $25. The
present Court concludes that United States v. Sonzinsky,24 which sustained
a tax on dealers in certain objectionable types of firearms, limited the Con-
stantine decision to a measure where taxation consequences were expressly
dependent on the criminality of the subject taxed. Here the Court observes
that the gambling tax applies to all persons regardless of whether they
violate state law. In point of fact, the gambling tax falls exclusively on
three types of gambling, two of which are illegal in 47 states, and the third
of which is universally illegal.25 One community has even made possession
19. See discussion by Senator Kefauver, 97 CONG. Rac. 12232 (1951), and colloquy
between Representatives Cooper and Hoffman, 97 CONG. Rm 6891 (1951). See also
Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States
Senate, Treasury-Post Office Departments Appropriations for 1953, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
444 (1952) and Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations, House
of Representatives, Treasury-Post Office Departments for 1953, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
426 (1952) (testimony of Commissioner of Internal Revenue John B. Dunlap).
20. Instant case at 512 and n.3.
21. The reports of the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means
Committee investigating H.R. 3473 estimated that the occupational tax and the 10%
revenue tax would yield $400 million a year. SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
112 (1951), and H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1951).
22. Between November 1, 1951, and June 30, 1952, there were filed 22,401 Forms
11-C (Special Tax Return and Application for Registry-Wagering). The stamp tax
collections for that period amounted to $606,561.68. In the same period the excise tax
collections (10% on wagers) amounted to $4,615,196.42. Communication to the
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW from Justin F. Winkle, Assistant Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 18, 1952), on file, Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Between July 1, 1952 (the start
of a new fiscal year), and October 31, 1952, there were 11,997 Forms 11-C filed
on which the collections amounted to $516,907.80. In the same period, the excise tax
collections on wagering amounted to $3,316,768.04. Communication to the UNI-
v sITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW R VIEw from T. C. Atkinson, Acting Assistant
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 29, 1952), on file,
Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School. While no offical figures
were available as to the cost of collection of taxes during that period, Commissioner
Dunlap, seeking appropriations for his department for 1953, testified that he expected
the additional cost of collection allocable to this tax to be $20,000,000, besides taking
some of his revenue agents away from their normal jobs and thus decreasing the
amount of revenue which they could collect. Hearings, supra note 19, Senate at 442,
House at 423.
23. Supra note 15.
24. Supra note 11.
25. The act expressly excludes from its operations wagers placed in parimutuels,
65 STAT. 529, 26 U.S.C. §3285(e) (Supp. 1952), and implicitly excludes organized
club games, charitable lotteries, and friendly wagers by its definition of a taxable
"lottery," 65 STAT. 529, 26 U.S.C. § 3285(b) (2) (Supp. 1952). The foregoing
forms of gambling are legal in many states. But, as Senator Kefauver pointed out
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of such a stamp a crime,26 and possession or purchase of the stamp has been
held to be probative evidence of the commission of a crime.
27
The instant decision leaves a broad area where Congress by its power
to tax may achieve results beyond its direct legislative power. Perhaps
the Court will scrutinize more closely the taxing power where the affected
activity is regarded as morally less offensive. But it now appears that so
long as any revenue is produced, the revenue purposes of Congress may be
entirely secondary. Any regulation of a proscribed subject, if wrapped in
the "verbal cellophane of a revenue measure" 28 is apt to be sustained if it is
not conditioned on the commission of a crime, or conjoined with a pervasive
regulatory scheme. The difficulty of writing an opinion 29 preventing the
encroachment on state prerogatives without impairing the legitimate exer-
cise of the taxing power, continues to inspire ad hoc decisions, not readily
reconcilable.
Criminal Law-
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED
BY PROMISE OF IMMUNITY DENIED
The Secretary of the Treasury issued a policy announcement to the
effect that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would not recommend
criminal prosecution of persons making voluntary disclosure of tax de-
ficiencies.' Subsequently petitioner consulted with agents of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue and, upon reiteration of the policy statement, supplied
them with personal records and affidavits in order that the Treasury might
compute his tax deficiency. Later, upon learning that criminal prosecution
of his case had been recommended, he petitioned the district court to sup-
press from evidence before the grand jury the records and testimony so
provided. On appeal the circuit court sustained the denial of this motion.
Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1952).
Suppression of evidence from the grand jury protects the accused from
the stigma of a criminal indictment and the legal expenses of defense where
the prosecution is dependent on the suppressed evidence. Opposing con-
cerns in pre-indictment suppression are the delay and interruption to the
in explaining the bill, 97 CONG. REc. 12231 (1951), the tax falls on bookmaking and
numbers-writing (which are illegal in every state but Nevada), and on lotteries
(which are prohibited universally). See Ploscowe, The Law of Gambling, 269
ANNALS 1, 2-4 (1950).
26. Ordinance of Moline, Illinois effective March 25, 1952.
27. State v. Curry, -Ohio-, 109 N.E.2d 298, 301 (1952).
28. See instant case at 517 (Justice Frankfurter dissenting).
29. See instant case at 516 (Justice Jackson concurring).
1. The policy statement issued by Secretary of the Treasury Vinson on August
21, 1945, read in part: "The Commissioner of Internal Revenue does not recommend
criminal prosecution in the case of any taxpayer who makes a voluntary disclosure of
omission or other misstatement in his tax return." Instant case at 384.
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prosecution by requiring it to establish the propriety of its evidence, the
necessity of assembling witnesses for an additional proceeding and the
added burden of the proceedings on the courts. Additional considerations
are the opportunity for delaying tactics since such motions are appealable,
and the possibility that the challenged evidence may not be used or be
necessary for indictment or that the petitioner will not be indicted in any
event.
2
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for pre-indictment
suppression only where evidence has been obtained by unreasonable search
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 This limitation is somewhat
arbitrary 4 in view of the fact that violations of other constitutional rights
are more seriously regarded than unreasonable search and seizure.5  How-
ever, the Second Circuit in In re Fried 6 allowed pre-indictment suppression
of a confession obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment on the ground
that where evidence has been gathered in violation of any constitutional
right there is no rational basis for distinguishing allowable procedures
according to the Amendment violated.
7
It is arguable that since the accused may be equally damaged by any
evidence allowed to go before the grand jury that would not be admitted
at trial, pre-indictment suppression should be granted wherever the ques-
tioned evidence would be inadmissible at trial.8 But with cogent argu-
ments against any use of this extraordinary remedy, a rule that allows
suppression only for constitutional violation has the advantage of eliminating
a host of issues otherwise available for dilatory tactics. Furthermore, a
discrimination permitting a special procedure to secure effectively minimal
constitutional guarantees is not unreasonable.
2. See Note, Pre-Trial Suppression of Unlawfully Obtained Evideice, 60 HARv.
L. Rxv. 1145 (1947).
3. FED. R. CRIm. P. 41(e).
4. A possible basis for the distinction is the more frequent occurrence of the
Fourth Amendment issue.
5. Compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding that evidence ob-
tained by unreasonable search and seizure in violation of rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment need not be excluded at trial in state courts), with Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that evidence obtained in a manner violative of due
process must be excluded). Due process also requires state courts to exclude "coerced"
confessions. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) and cases cited therein.
6. 161 F2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947).
7. The power to suppress in situations not provided for in the procedural rules is
based on the inherent power of the court to discipline an officer of the court. Instant
case at 385.
8. Under such a rule the evidence questioned in the present case would be sup-
pressed, for confessions induced by the most insubstantial promises of immunity have
been held inadmissible on an amalgam of notions of fair play and possible unreliability.
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 835 et seq. (3d ed. 1940). See also Note, 7 A.L.R. 419
(1920). At trial the evidence in the present case could be excluded as a means of
policing undesirable enforcement tactics by federal officials. McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943), would offer precedent. See also Rex v. Barker, [1941] 2 K.B.
381, an English decision extending the rule excluding confessions obtained by promise
to cover documentary evidence acquired under circumstances similar to those in the
instant case.
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A result contrary to that of the instant case was reached in In re
Liebster,9 where a district court allowed pre-indictment suppression of
evidence induced by the same Treasury Department promise of immunity.
There it was held that use of the evidence would violate the Fifth Amend-
ment. While the basis of the decision is not shown, a possible rationale
is that the court viewed evidence induced by promises of immunity as a
species of "involuntary" confession inadmissible in the federal courts as
violative of the privilege against self-incrimination. Support for this con-
clusion is found in dictum in Bran v. United States.10  So viewed, the
evidence in the instant case would have been suppressible under the rule
of the Fried case.
While intimating disagreement with the extension made by the Fried
decision, the court in the instant case distinguished it on the ground that
here no constitutional right had yet been violated. Whether the use of the
evidence at trial would constitute a violation was not decided. Although it
is doubtful that use of the evidence for purposes of indictment would violate
due process," Supreme Court dictum indicates a substantial possibility
that use at trial of confessions induced by promises of immunity would.12
If this is so, and if the Fried case is accepted, there is no sufficient rea-
son to refuse a decision of the constitutional question at the pre-indictment
stage. Such a decision is necessary to afford petitioner the protection which
it is the policy of pre-indictment suppression to give. The reasons for not
deciding the question are the possibility that the evidence may never
be used at trial and a desire to avoid unnecessary decision of constitutional
questions. But both objections apply with equal force to pre-indictment
suppression in the unreasonable search and coerced confession cases.
Those cases must be interpreted as recognizing a policy that effective pro-
tection against constitutional violation with regard to evidence means
protection at the pre-indictment stage.' 3 Decision of the constitutional
question would have eliminated the possibility that the petitioner may have
to incur the stigma of indictment and trial for an offense which can never
be established by admissible evidence. 14
9. 91 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
10. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). See also State v. Thornton, 245 Mo. 436, 150 S.W.
1048 (1912) (holding that confessions obtained by promises of immunity violate the
self-incrimination privilege of state constitution). The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion rationale of the Brain case is criticized in 3 WiG foR, EVIDENcE § 823 (3d ed.
1940). Dictum in United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951) indicates that it
is not settled whether such confessions are excluded because of the privilege against
self-incrimination or because of untrustworthiness.
11. A majority of jurisdictions refuse even to inquire into the legality or com-
petency of the evidence produced before the grand jury. See Notes, 31 A.L.R. 1479
(1924) and 24 A.L.R. 1432 (1923). The allowance of pre-indictment suppression is
not considered a requirement of due process even in the limited area contemplated
by the federal rule. See instant case at 385 et seq.
12. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941).
13. See opinion of Judge Frank in In re Fried, supra note 6, at 458, discussing the
argument that since the challenged evidence would be inadmissible at trial the accused
is not harmed by its use before the grand jury.
14. Cf. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (holding that evidence
obtained by use of evidence procured in illegal wiretapping could not be admitted at
trial).
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Fixtures-
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE ON INDUSTRIAL
PREMISES CREATES INDUSTRIAL PLANT
MORTGAGE AS A MATTER OF LAW
In 1947 a bank took a real estate mortgage from the owner of a
brewery, in return for a loan of $30,000. The mortgage described the
brewery premises simply by metes and bounds, without referring to any
buildings thereon. In 1950, a new owner gave a chattel mortgage covering
the machinery and equipment on the premises, in return for a loan of
$6,000. This chattel mortgage was assigned to petitioner, who knew that
the machinery and equipment were used in the brewery. Petitioner lent
the new owner further sums, and in March, 1951 took another chattel mort-
gage covering the same property as the first, in the sum of $25,300 to secure
repayment of these loans. In April, 1951, the bank foreclosed its real
estate mortgage, and at the foreclosure sale purchased, with the land, the
machinery and equipment used on the premises, including trucks and office
furniture and equipment. Petitioner sought to have the sale of the ma-
chinery and equipment set aside on the ground that it was not covered
by the real estate mortgage and hence his chattel mortgage had first lien.
The lower court upheld the sale. On petitioner's appeal, it was held that all
of the machinery and equipment except the trucks and office furniture and
equipment was covered by the real estate mortgage under the "industrial
plant mortgage" doctrine. First Nat. Bank of Mount Carmel v. Reichneder,
371 Pa. 463, 91 A.2d 277 (1952).
Under an industrial plant mortgage, all articles placed on industrial
premises for permanent use in the manufacturing conducted there, whether
or not they are attached to the land, are considered fixtures and hence part
of the land subject to the real estate mortgage.' While this doctrine has
been widely adopted, it has been developed more fully in Pennsylvania than
anywhere else 2 The purpose of the doctrine is to preserve for the real
estate mortgagee the going-concern value of industrial premises which he
originally relied upon for his security.3 Since the doctrine was first an-
nounced in Voorhis v. Freeman,4 over a hundred years ago, there has been
1. An industrial plant mortgage has been held to prevail over the lien of a sub-
sequent attaching creditor, McClure v. Atlantic Rock Co., 339 Pa. 296, 14 A.2d 124
(1940), and the claim of a receiver, Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Harkins, 312 Pa.
402, 167 Atl. 278 (1933), or a trustee in bankruptcy, In re Taylor & Dean Mfg. Co.,
136 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1943), representing general creditors.
2. See Note, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 396, 399-400 (1945). See also, Kratovil,
Fixtures and the Real Estate Mortgage, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV. 180, 183 (1948). The
industrial plant mortgage doctrine is sometimes called the "institutional" theory of
fixtures, although the latter term is probably meant to signify an application of the
same principle to other than industrial premises. See Kratovil, supra, at 216-217.
Pennsylvania also applies a rule similar to the industrial plant mortgage doctrine in
determining what articles are fixtures for the purpose of real estate taxation. See
United Laundries, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 359 Pa. 195, 58 A.2d 833
(1948).
3. See Note, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 396, 400 (1947).
4. 2 W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841).
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no doubt that a general reference to machinery and equipment in a mortgage
description creates an industrial plant mortgage. In Commonwealth Trust
Co. v. Harkins,5 it was held that an industrial plant mortgage was created
when the mortgage description contained the form language "buildings
. and appurtenances" and the terms of the mortgage bond and the
testimony of the mortgagor indicated that such a mortgage was intended.
The federal courts also took the view that under Pennsylvania law the in-
tention of the parties was the test,6 and in a case where the mortgage con-
tained no building and appurtenance clause, the Third Circuit held that
since evidence dehors the mortgage instrument showed that no industrial
plant mortgage was intended, none was created.7 But in Roos v. Fairy
Silk Mills,8 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected the view that
evidence dehors the records of title could affect the coverage of the mort-
gage, and held that a building and appurtenance clause in itself created an
industrial plant mortgage. While the court relied upon the building and
appurtenance clause, this form language did not really express any intention
of the parties.9 As long as the premises were industrial property when the
mortgage was given,10 and the industrial use continued, 1 the position of the
Supreme Court seemed to be that any real estate mortgage on the premises
was an industrial plant mortgage.
In holding in the instant case that an industrial plant mortgage was
created in the absence of a building and appurtenance clause, the Supreme
Court removed all doubt that industrial plant mortgages arise by operation
of law.' 2
Under the Chattel Mortgage Act, a real estate mortgage covering
chattels attached to the realty prevails over the lien of a subsequent chattel
5. 312 Pa. 402, 167 Atl. 278 (1933).
6. Kennedy v. Crumlish, 85 F.2d 665, 666 (3d Cir. 1936); In re Highland Silk
Co., 41 F.2d 404 (E.D. Pa. 1929), aff'd 41 F2d 405 (3d Cir. 1930).
7. Delaware County Nat. Bank v. Montgomery, 78 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1935).
8. 334 Pa. 305, 5 A2d 569 (1939).
9. "What has happened in the development of the doctrine is that an inference
originally based on the supposed intention of the parties to a mortgage transaction
has crystallized into a rule of law predicated upon the desirability of protecting the
safety of investments. Expression of intention by the parties is not necessary." In re
Taylor & Dean Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 370, 373 (3d Cir. 1943).
10. But where the mortgage instrument shows that any industrial use to which
the premises might be put was to be security for the mortgagee, the mortgage covers
machinery and equipment used in industrial operations which were not conducted on
the premises when the mortgage was given. McClure v. Atlantic Rock Co., 339 Pa.
296, 14 A.2d 124 (1940).
I1. In Pennsylvania Chocolate Co. v. Hershey Bros. (No. 1), 316 Pa. 292, 296-
300, 175 Atl. 694, 695-697 (1934), the court indicated that where a new and separate
business not indicated in the mortgage instrument is commenced on the premises after
the mortgage is given, the machinery and equipment used in the new business is not
covered by the mortgage. However, the court held that the business conducted on the
premises when the mortgage was foreclosed was merely a continuation of the original
business.
12. This is not to say, however, that such a mortgage could not except and reserve
industrial machinery and equipment from its lien by an express provision to that effect.
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mortgage. 13 The court applied this provision in the instant case to defeat
the petitioner's claim. The machinery and equipment, being fixtures under
the industrial plant mortgage doctrine, were regarded as attached to the
realty within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Act. Since the chattel
mortgagee was merely a subsequent lender of money, the security of the
prior lender should not, except at his own option, be diminished. Although
the chattel mortgagee in the instant case admittedly knew of the industrial
nature of the premises where the machinery and equipment were kept, the
same result would probably obtain if he had not investigated the premises.'
4
In such a case, he should be charged with constructive notice of the indus-
trial character of the premises and possibility of a covering mortgage by
reason of the industrial nature of the articles. It does not follow, however,
that a chattel mortgage lender should be charged with such notice when un-
attached articles upon which he relies are not articles ordinarily used only
on industrial premises. Personal inspection of such articles would not
necessarily put him on inquiry as to the existence of an industrial plant
mortgage.' 5 Furthermore it is clear that when unattached articles are
located on non-industrial premises, a provision in a real estate mortgage
purporting to subject them to its lien will be ineffective as against third
parties.' 6 This category of articles includes the office furniture and equip-
ment and the trucks likewise held not subject to the industrial plant mort-
gage in the instant case. It is therefore probable that a similar provision
in an industrial plant mortgage would not extend its coverage beyond the
limits of the test set forth in this case that only articles essential to the
manufacture of the product are subject to the mortgage, other articles used
in the operation of the mortgagor's business being excluded.' 7 Adherence
to this test, which until now has never been clearly enunciated, will eliminate
the necessity of inquiring into whether a chattel mortgage lender actually
knew that the articles he relied upon were used on industrial premises,
in resolving conflicts between him and an industrial plant mortgagee.
13. ". . . Provided further, that any real estate mortgage covering the realty and
chattels attached to realty shall remain a prior lien to a chatttel mortgage placed
subsequently thereon. .... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 940.5 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
14. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the court does not state
whether the assignor of petitioner's $6000 chattel mortgage knew of the industrial
nature of the premises.
15. Even though trucks, office furniture and equipment and similar articles may
customarily be kept by the mortgagor on premises subject to an industrial plant
mortgage, the industrial plant mortgagee in search of credit may see to it that they
are located on other premises when a prospective chattel mortgagee comes to inspect
them. Although beer bottles and kegs were held subject to the real estate mortgage
in the instant case, 371 Pa. 463, 476, 91 A.2d 277, 282 (1952), nevertheless, these are
articles which normally are owned only by breweries, being returned to the brewery
after consumption of their contents.
16. Klaus v. Majestic Apartment House Co., 250 Pa. 194, 95 Atl. 451 (1915)
(apartment hotel furniture) ; Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 104 Pa. Super. 493, 158 AtI. 634 (1932) (apartment house furniture). Bid cf.
Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Stout, 339 Pa. 302, 14 A.2d 282 (1940) (apartment
house elevator).
17. 371 Pa. 463, 470-471, 91 A.2d 277, 280 (1952).
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A different problem than that presented by the instant case is raised
when an industrial buyer enters into a conditional sale, bailment lease or
purchase money chattel mortgage. It has been suggested that such security
interests should prevail over an industrial plant mortgage, for the purchase
money creditor actually adds to, rather than detracts from, the security
of the real estate mortgagee from the business point of view.'8 This con-
sideration is limited, however, by the need to protect the real estate mort-
gagee from physical injury to the premises resulting from removal of the
chattel upon foreclosure of the purchase money interest. A 1935 amend-
ment 19 to the Pennsylvania version of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
adequately safeguards both interests by providing that a conditional sale
prevails over an industrial plant mortgage while affording the real estate
mortgagee the right to demand a bond to protect the realty from physical
injury due to removal. While there are no cases on point, the Chattel Mort-
gage Act seems to permit a purchase money chattel mortgagee to prevail,
20
at least where no physical injury to the land would result from removal.
21
Under a bailment lease, however, the law appears to be that once the bailed
machinery or equipment is installed on the premises, the industrial plant
mortgagee prevails.2 2 The Uniform Commercial Code 23 will apply the rule
of the Pennsylvania conditional sales statute to all purchase money security
interests, regardless of form. At the same time, it will give an industrial
plant mortgagee priority over a subsequent money lender who relies upon
industrial machinery and equipment on the premises as his security,24 and
hence will not alter the result of the instant case.
Labor -Law-
VALIDITY OF NEW NLRB METHOD OF
COMPUTING BACK-PAY FOR WRONGFULLY
DISCHARGED EMPLOYEES
The National Labor Relations Board ordered that respondent employer
reinstate certain employees discriminatorily discharged and reimburse them
for loss of back wages, the amount to be computed on the basis of quarterly
earnings although the employees were not compensated on a quarterly
basis. On petition to enforce the order, the court of appeals modified the
18. See Note, 17 U. OF CHL L. REv. 745 (1950).
19. PA. STAT. Axx. tit. 69, § 404 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 940.5, 94 0.14(a), 940.15 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
21. See 13 U. oF PiTT. L. REv. 574, 583 (1952).
22. Cf. Bullock Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lehigh Valley Traction Co., 231 Pa. 129, 80
Atl. 568 (1911); see Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co. (No. 3), 316
Pa. 312, 315, 175 Ati. 701, 702 (1934).
23. UNxiFOR COMMERCIAL CoDE § 9-313 (Official Draft 1952), and comments
3, 4 and 5.
24. Id., at comment 2.
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method of computation." The Supreme Court reversed, 6-3, directing
enforcement of the order. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 73
Sup. Ct. 287 (1953).
Section 10(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act,2 which was a reenactment of
the original section of the Wagner Act,3 authorizes the board to reinstate
wrongfully discharged employees with or without back-pay. In 1935, in
one of its earliest decisions, 4 the board adopted the rule that when back-pay
was ordered in cases of reinstatement, the amount was to be determined by
subtracting any subsequent earnings of the employee on another job from
what he normally would have earned on his original job between the time
of discharge and an offer of reemployment. 5 Only net earnings were to be
subtracted.8 Wages which the employee would have earned in addition to
those of his original job were not subject to the rule.7 But the board can-
not arbitrarily refuse to permit some mitigation of damages by ignoring all
of the earnings of the employee elsewhere,8 because the provision is not
punitive but remedial, designed to make the employee whole.9 Thus,
amounts earned on governmental work projects must be deducted.10
Wilfull failure of an employee to seek other work must also be considered in
assessing the amount owed him.11 In 1950, the board changed its basic
formula.12 Under the new rule, the working year is divided into four
quarters.'3 Amounts earned outside in any quarter are deducted from what
normally would have been earned in that quarter, but earnings in one
quarter have no effect upon back-pay liability for another quarter.14 The
instant case upheld the validity of the new rule. 15
1. 196 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1952).
2. 61 STAT. 136, 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (Supp. 1951).
3. 49 STAT. 449, 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1946).
4. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 51 (1935), enforceinent
granted, 303 U.S. 261 (1937).
5. As a hypothetical illustration of the rule, suppose A were wrongfully discharged
January 1. He is not offered reemployment until July 1,, six months later. During
that time the old job would have paid $800. Subsequent to discharge he obtains another
job, which has paid'him $600 to July 1. A is entitled to collect $200 ($800- $600).
6. See Crosset Lumber Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 440, 498 (1938), "To the extent that all
such expenses [transportation, room and board, moving] diminished the earnings of
the employees . .. , such earnings shall not be deducted. .. ."
7. Pusey, Maynes & Breisch Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 482 (1936) ; National Motor Bearing
Co., 5 N.L.RB. 409 (1938).
8. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941); Republic Steel
Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 7 (1940) (by implication).
9. Republic Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
10. Ibid. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Gullet Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951) (state unemploy-
ment compensation payments need not be deducted in computing back-pay awards).
11. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
12. F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950). The board's new formulation
is now known as the Woolworth Rule.
13. The quarters begin on January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1.
14. To illustrate the distinction between the two rules: suppose that in the illustra-
tion in note 5 suPra, A's $800 wages were divided in equal $400 amounts between the
two quarters involved. After discharge, he fails to obtain subsequent employment until
April 1, the beginning of a new quarter. Thereafter he earns $600. Under the old
formula A was entitled to collect $200. Under the new formula, A is entitled to $400
for the first quarter ($400- 0), nothing for the second quarter (he earned more than
$400), and since the quarters are treated separately, A can collect $400.
15. Respondent contended that the employees (soft-drink salesmen-drivers) earned
three times as much in the first and last quarters as in the second and third. The
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In explaining why it bad changed from the former rule, the board
noted that use of the rule had sometimes adversely affected "the companion
remedy of reinstatement." Whenever an employee's interim earnings were
greater than on his original job, an employer had an incentive to delay
making an offer of reemployment, because each day spent on the better-
paying job decreased the employer's back-pay liability.'0 Conversely, the
employee often felt constrained to waive his right to reinstatement in order
to prevent a continuing reduction of the amount owed him. The new rule
is effective in meeting both of these objections; but its unmodified applica-
tion in all situations may result in financial penalties against certain em-
ployers in excess of those actually needed to effectuate the board's policies.
The financial consequences of the new rule will differ from those of the
previous one only when an employee, in some of the quarters but not all,
earns more than he would have earned on the original job. If the outside
wages are the same or less, the amount of recovery under both rules is
identical. Therefore, the largest increased liability for employers, as well
as the greatest excess compensation to employees, will occur when there has
been a long delay before the employee acquires his higher-paid job 17 or
when either his original or subsequent employment is of a seasonal type
and his other employment calls for steady average wages. 18 In the case
where delay leads to increased liability, it is a fact that the employee who
delays longest stands the best chance to receive excess compensation. But
criticism of the new rule on this score must be tempered by two factors:
(1) employees will still be penalized because of unreasonable delay amount-
ing to shirking of job opportunities; 19 (2) the board, in formulating the
rule, presupposed that normally there would be involuntary delay before
new work was obtained. This period, the board found, is generally charac-
terized by loss of savings, a sharp drop in the employee's standard of
living, and psychological stress. These elements should be compensable,
and such compensation should not be eliminated by the fortuitous circum-
stance of the employee later finding a better-paying job.20 But when
majority of the Court felt that the objections based on the seasonal nature of the
business were not properly before them since not raised at the board hearing. For
an illustration of the financial impact of the board's formula in this type of case, see
note 18 infra.
16. Suppose A was earning $8 per day. Ten working days after discharge, A is
entitled to $80. He then obtains a job paying $10 per day. After 15 days, A is
entitled to only $70 ($120-$50) ; after 20 days, only $60. After 50 days, A's employer
would be completely discharged. The new formula prevents this steady diminution
as soon as one quarter has passed and another begun.
17. See note 14 supra.
18. Suppose A earns $2400 per year as follows: $900 in the first quarter, $300 in
the second and third, and $900 in the fourth. He is discharged January 1 and imme-
diately obtains a new job paying $2400 in monthly amounts of $200 (or $600 per
quarter). Under the old formula, A's employer has no liability for back-pay; under
the new formula, A is entitled to $600 ($300 in the first and fourth quarters). The
entitlement will be the same if A's original job is the non-seasonal one and the subse-
quent one the seasonal.
19. See note 11 supra.
20. See note 12 supra at 292.
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seasonal employment is involved, awards may well amount to sums far
greater than are necessary to insure just compensation for employees. A
discharged seasonal employee who obtains non-seasonal work almost always
will earn more than his old normal pay in some quarters and less in others.
When he earns less, his employer's liability increases; when he earns more,
it is not diminished. The greater the fluctuations, the greater will be his
excess compensation. The instant case assumes that when faced with the
additional factor of seasonal employment, the board in assessing damages
will use its broad discretionary powers to modify the rule in those in-
stances. 21 So interpreted, the rule, though it might tend to overcompensate
employees, can hardly be regarded as other than a reasonable attempt of the
board to render complementary the dual remedies of reinstatement and back-
pay, which have been found in experience to conflict.
Taxation-
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BY SETTLEMENT
BEFORE TAX COURT HEARING
An income tax deficiency was assessed against the defendant for the
years 1943, 1944 and 1945 on the ground that the cost figure used as a
basis of depreciation of defendant's building was excessive due to an over-
valuation of stock used to purchase the building in 1913. In 1944, defend-
ant's petition to the Tax Court for review of a deficiency assessed on the
same ground for the years 1933, 1938 and 1939 had resulted before trial
in a stipulation of the parties in complete settlement, stating merely that
"there is no deficiency in Federal income tax due." There had been no
hearing and no stipulation of facts in the Tax Court.' In the present action,
the district court held that the judgment of the Tax Court entered pursuant
to the stipulation in the prior action merely confirmed an agreement of
counsel and was not a decision by the court.2 The circuit court of appeals
reversed, holding that since the consent decree was arrived at only after
21. According to the majority opinion, the employer is obliged to raise specifically
the seasonal employment factors involved in order to invoke the board's discretionary
powers to modify application of the rule. Thus, he generally will first urge them
before the trial examiner, who makes the preliminary awards. If the examiner fails
to accord them adequate weight, the employer may file exceptions to the report
before the board, again specifically urging their recognition. If the board does not
sustain the exceptions, then, upon the board's petition for enforcement, the employer
can raise them as a defense against the order. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, believed
that seasonal employment factors, which the examiner and the board must necessarily
be aware of in making the computation, should automatically constitute an exception
to the formula, even in the absence of specific objections by the employer. In other
situations, however, he would uphold the validity of the rule.
1. As used here a stipulation in complete settlement is one which contains no
agreement as to specific facts and leaves nothing to be decided by the court. A stipula-
tion of specific facts, although making litigation as to such facts unnecessary, still
leaves the final determination, based upon these facts, to be made by the court.
2. 97 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
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extensive and deliberate negotiations, the Commissioner was estopped from
relitigating the issue of cost in thfe suit for taxes for subsequent years.
International Building Co. v. United States, 199 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1952),
cert. granted, 344 U.S. 427 (1953).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, which prevents relitigation of issues
actually litigated and determined in a prior suit between the same parties
though on a different cause of action,3 has full application to questions of
fact in federal tax cases although its application to questions of law has
been severely limited.4 Due to the recurrent nature of tax liability and the
fact that each tax year is the basis of a new cause of action,5 the operation
of collateral estoppel in tax cases often has an important effect in barring
litigation on an issue conclusive of liability for succeeding tax periods.
This may work a hardship if indiscriminately applied to cases where the
issue was settled in a consent decree and the facts were never litigated.
Although the general rule in all cases is that a consent decree, like judg-
ment entered after contest, will operate as res judicata to bar another suit
on the same cause of action," courts are divided on the effect of such a
decree as the basis of a plea of collateral estoppel in a new cause of action.
In Trapp v. United States,7 a prior action on the same facts but for a
different tax year had resulted in a judgment based on a stipulation in
complete settlement with no stipulation of facts and no determination on
the merits by the court.8 The court of appeals for the tenth circuit held
that such a judgment is not a decision that will support a plea of collateral
estoppel on an issue of fact in a later proceeding, pointing out that the
stipulation did not set forth any of the basic facts on which the conclusion
of the parties was reached. The court in the instafit case, while recog-
nizing the applicability of the Trapp case, specifically refuses to follow its
holding.
In other tax cases, it has been held that a fact conceded by the Com-
missioner and necessarily implied in a stipulation of facts submitted to the
3. Collateral estoppel is to be distinguished from res judicata which is that
principle which bars a second suit between the same parties on the same cause of
action and prevents litigation of any issue which was or might have been litigated
in the prior proceeding. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). See Scott,
Collateral Estoppel by Aidgment, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1942) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDG-
MENTS § 68 (1942).
4. The application of collateral estoppel to questions of law in federal tax cases
has steadily diminished in a series of cases culminating with Commissioner v. Sunnen,
333 U.S. 591 (1948), which held that an intervening Supreme Court decision changing
the law will be sufficient to prevent its application. See Note, 35 IowA L. REv. 700
(1950).
5. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948) ; United States v. C. C. Clark,
159 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1947).
6. Tait v. Western Md. Ry., 289 U.S. 620 (1933); Art Metal Const. Co. v.
United States, 13 F. Supp. 756 (Ct. Cl. 1936). For the effect of an informal settle-
ment between the Commissioner and the taxpayer, see Gutkin, Informal Tax Settle-
ments and Their Binding Effect, 4 TAx L. REv. 477 (1949).
7. 177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
8. Riter v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 301 (1944), distinguishes between a stipulation
of facts and a stipulation in complete settlement, the former held binding in a subse-
quent action and the latter not binding.
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court had not been litigated since the court had nothing to pass upon.9
However, the Tax Court has been reluctant to allow litigation as to a fact,
specifically stipulated in a prior suit, in which the court had rendered an
independent judgment based on the facts stipulated. 10 The better rule
appears to be that the binding effect of a stipulation of specific facts should
be governed by the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement
and gathered from surrounding circumstances rather than by mechanical
application of general rules." The one case in which a strict application
of collateral estoppel seems warranted is where the consent decree has been
entered only after the facts have been fully tried and submitted. Here
foreclosure of relitigation is necessary to prevent the imposition of a burden
on the court and the opposing party.12
Where, as in the instant case, there has been no litigation of the issues
in an action which terminates in a judgment on a stipulation in complete
settlement, the court makes no independent determination and its role is in
effect limited to approving a contract between the parties.13 Such a decree
should not be given effect as collateral estoppel since there are valid reasons
why a party may not wish to litigate a matter at a particular time. The
amount in controversy may be small, evidence may be difficult to obtain,
or the expense of litigation may be excessive due to circumstances at the
time.' 4 A stipulation of facts not in complete settlement has been held bind-
ing on the parties in a later action,15 but even in such a situation there may
have been a trading off of issues.' Both types of stipulations are dis-
couraged and the parties are bound for an unintended purpose if it is held
that the issues are closed when they arise in later years with a greater and
unanticipated significance. The very recurring nature of tax liability
is a factor against foreclosing a party from trying an issue unless it has been
passed on by a court after contest.' 7 The decision in the instant case may
well have the effect of encouraging litigation because a party in a tax suit
may feel obliged, no matter how small the amount involved, to litigate fully
9. Hartford-Empire Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1943). See also
Blaffer v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1943).
10. James v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 712 (1934).
11.. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HAxv. L. REv. 818, 840 (1952);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTs § 68, comment h (1942); Note, 2 A.L.R.2d 516 (1946).
12. Macheras v. Syrmopoulos, 319 Mass. 485, 66 N.E.2d 351 (1946).
13. An agreement between the parties in settlement of a controversy before there
has been any recourse to the courts would presumably be treated as any other contract
and given no effect as collateral estoppel since there has in no sense been a decision
by the court.
14. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1932).
15. James v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 712 (1934).
16. BIcK roR, SUCCESSFUtL TAX PAc-ricE 335, 378 (2d ed. 1952). The author
indicates that the Attorney General's Department which handles tax cases in the dis-
trict court makes far greater use of its compromising powers than the Bureau of
Internal Revenue which is the enforcing agency in the Tax Court.
17. Gillespie v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1945). ". . . [T]he doc-
trine [of collateral estoppel] should be sparingly applied in tax cases involving liability
for different years, and generally it is not applied where the taxable events and trans-
actions are by their nature fluid and subject to change from year to year ..
Id. at 906.
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any question of fact likely to figure largely in liability for subsequent tax
years. It would seem that the court has gone too far in its endeavor to
save time and expense of litigation when it bars trial of an issue which was
never heard before a court in the prior action.' s
Wills-
TORT REMEDY FOR CHANGE INDUCED BY
FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS DENIED
Plaintiff and defendant were sisters. Their father's will provided that
they were to share a multi-million dollar estate. The will appointed de-
fendant sister's husband the executor and co-trustee. A codicil then dis-
inherted plaintiff in favor of her sister. After the will was probated,
plaintiff sued defendant sister and her husband in trespass, alleging that
defendants by fraud had induced testator to change his will.' On appeal the
court held that this action was a collateral attack on the probated will and
plaintiff's only remedy was to appeal from probate. Mangold v. Neuntan,
371 Pa. 496, 91 A.2d 904 (1952).
In will fraud cases application for relief was traditionally to either the
probate court or to equity. The settled view was that resort must be had
to probate when it was competent to grant relief.2 Thus where a will had
been fraudulently procured and the rightful heirs would take by intestacy
if it were set aside,3 or where a revoking codicil had been procured by
fraud,4 the remedy was in probate because that court could do justice by
setting aside the will or by striking the codicil. But where the deceased
had been wrongfully prevented from making a will 5 or from altering it,6
or where striking a provision procured by fraud would not revert the prop-
erty to the rightful recipient,7 equity alone could provide relief since the
18. Henricksen v. Seward, 135 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1943). Collateral estoppel
"as applied in tax litigation, is sufficiently elastic to permit of the balancing of
conveniences and the weighing of other considerations as against that of desired
repose." Id. at 989. See also, Cleary, Res Jtdicata Re-examined, 57 Y.LE L.J. 339
(1948).
An interesting problem is presented when, though there has been no change in
the Treasury regulations which might be treated for purposes of collateral estoppel
as a change in the law, Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 176 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1949),
there has still been a change in the policy of the Commissioner in applying those
regulations. Present in such a case is the element of unfairness and inequality among
taxpayers which militated so strongly for the result in the Sunnen case, supra note 3.
1. One of the fraudulent representations alleged was that plaintiff had conceived
an illegitimate child and had had an abortion. [Record, p. 7a].
2. See generally, ATKINSON, WILLS § 100 (1937) ; Evans, Torts to Expectancies
in Decedents' Estates, 93 U. OF PA. L. REv. 187 (1944).
3. Langdon v. Blackburn, 109 Cal. 19, 41 Pac. 814 (1895).
4. Allen v. M'Pherson, 1 H.L. Cas. 191, 9 Eng. Rep. 727 (1847).
5. Dixon v. Olmius, 1 Cox Ch. Cas. 414, 29 Eng. Rep. 1227 (1787).
6. Latham v. Father Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 85 N.E2d 168 (1949).
7. Where the wrongful conduct of a third party has deprived plaintiff of his
rightful legacy and resulted in a bequest to an innocent legatee, the better view is that
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probate courts refused to write new wills. The relatively recent emergence
of the doctrine of torts to expectancies provides a third remedy which,
though it does not award the rightful legatee the specific property he should
have received from the will, is capable, if permitted, of providing adequate
relief by means of damages in most cases formerly covered by both equity
and probate. However, it is as yet uncertain when an election of remedies
is possible. Present authority indicates that tort may be used in lieu of
equity, but where probate can grant relief, the two cases on point indicate
that its jurisdiction is exclusive.8 The instant case is the first to fix the
jurisdiction of the common pleas court in a will fraud action in Pennsyl-
vania.9
The court's opinion gives the usual rationale for this position: a probate
decree is a judgment in rem and cannot be collaterally impeached by an
action in any other court. Of course, a suit in equity or an action for dam-
ages for wrongfully preventing the revocation of an existing will is just as
much of a collateral impeachment of the probate decree, in the sense that
recovery would strip the legatee of his inheritance.' 0 Hence the "collateral
impeachment" language does not fully explain why the courts have been
unwilling to allow the tort or equitable remedies in a situation such as the
instant case. A factor which may have influenced the leading English
decision 11 was the supposed expertise of the separate probate court system
there. This applies only partially in Pennsylvania; there are separate
probate courts in the more populous counties but in most areas the same
judges sit in both probate and tort cases.' 2 Another difference between
common pleas and probate is that jury trial is a matter of right in tort
actions but in probate it is given only at the trial judge's discretion. 13
Perhaps the judges feel that the absence of a jury is an assurance that wills
will not be upset easily. The language of the Pennsylvania cases indicates
the latter holds on constructive trust for plaintiff. Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 211
S.W.2d 559 (1948); Bohannon v. Trotman, 214 N.C. 706, 200 S.E. 852 (1939).
Contra: Dye v. Parker, 108 Kan. 304, 194 Pac. 640, aff'd on rehearing, 108 Kan. 305,
195 Pac. 599 (1921). The tort remedy may be ineffective here.
8. Axe v. Wilson, 150 Kan. 794, 96 P.2d 880 (1939) ; Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514,
100 Atl. 441 (1917). Cf. Allen v. Lowell's Adm'x, 303 Ky. 238, 197 S.W.2d 424
(1946) ; Thayer v. Kitchen, 200 Mass. 382, 86 N.E. 952 (1909), where it was held that
a tort action lies for wrongfully destroying a will only if probate court cannot probate
it. In Cunningham v. Edward, 52 Ohio App. 61, 3 N.E.2d 58 (1936), the court
expressly refused to recognize the doctrine of torts to expectancies.
9. Bunce v. Galbrath, 268 Pa. 389, 112 Atd. 143 (1920) seems to hold only that
there can be no appeal from the decree of the register of wills to any court after
the statute of limitations for appeal from that decree has run.
10. In the present case a tort action if allowed might leave the wife with some
of the money procured by fraud if the husband as joint tortfeasor ultimately satisfied
part of the judgment against them both.
11. Allen v. M'Pherson, supra note 4. Another factor in this case: Lord Camp-
bell said that to allow equity to impose a constructive trust might lead to a conflict
of appellate courts, since probate and equity each had different courts of last resort.
1 H.L. Cas. 191, 238, 9 Eng. Rep. 728, 747 (1847). This proposition does not apply in
Pennsylvania, where the state supreme court is the highest appellate tribunal for tort,
equity and probate cases.
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 §§ 2080.202, 2080.203 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
13. Fleming's Estate, 265 Pa. 399, 109 Atl. 265 (1919). (This case was decided
under a statute similar to the present statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 §2080.745
(Purdon Supp. 1952)).
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that the degree of proof required in an order to set aside a will affected by
fraud is nearly identical with the proof required in ordinary deceit actions.
14
Yet in practice the language may be applied with different results if only
because in will fraud cases the court must always act without the decisive
evidence that the defrauded person, the testator, could have provided. It
would not be surprising if probate judges are frequently insensitive to pleas
that would move a jury.
But even if juries are conceded to be undesirable in will contests, a
slight change in the factual situation will present a case which is considered
to be within the jury's competence. Thus if defendant has fraudulently
induced testator to change his will, as in the instant case, the case goes to
probate and the judge may deny plaintiff a jury, but if defendant has pre-
vented deceased from executing a will, plaintiff may seek a tort remedy ' 5
and insist upon a jury. And if plaintiff should go into equity instead, a
"sober" judge and not an "unpredictable" jury will decide the case, just
as in probate court. It would seem more logical either to allow the com-
mon pleas courts to consider all will fraud cases, or to give probate courts
the power to award damages. Neither of these alternatives is likely to be
adopted. The firm language of the decisions which restrict the remedies
and the few decisions in which will contests have been allowed to be taken
into equity and common pleas suggest that the judges are set against
extending the jurisdiction of these courts in will cases. To allow probate
to award damages in the case of the prevention of execution of a will would
impinge on the dogma that probate courts give only a judgment in rei.16
In the present case, plaintiff argued that probate's remedy-striking
out the codicil which had been procured by fraud-was inadequate because,
inter alia, recovery in tort would allow her to get a judgment for the whole
amount of the legacy at once, instead of receiving it in installments as the
will had provided. But there is no injustice in merely giving plaintiff what
she would have taken under the will, and to do otherwise would conflict
with the testator's original intent that she take in trust.
If the contested codicil were to be stricken, the allegedly fraudulent
husband would still be trustee under the previous codicil. But the Penn-
sylvania probate court can remove a trustee if he provokes active antagonism
between himself and the beneficiary and this antagonism is likely to
jeopardize the estate.17 Since the wrongdoing husband is not a beneficiary
14. In Phillips' Estate, 244 Pa. 35, 45, 90 Atl. 457, 461 (1914), the court said
that the evidence in wills cases must be "clear and convincing." In Lawrence's
Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 65, 132 AtI. 786, 789 (1926), the court said that the "manifest
weight of the evidence' must support a charge of fraud in a probate contest. And
in a contract action, Suravitz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 261 Pa. 390, 399, 104 At1. 754,
756 (1918), the court stated that fraud must be proved ". . . not only by preponderat-
ing evidence, but by preponderating evidence of a certain kind, character or quality,
which is not overstated by the phrase 'clear and satisfactory evidence.'"
15. Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 210 N.C. 679, 188 S.E. 390 (1936).
16. Goods of Schott, [1901] P. 190.
17. In Price's Estate, 209 Pa. 210, 212, 58 At. 280, 281 (1904), it was intimated
that a trustee's declaration that beneficiary is illegitimate might justify removal, if the
statement were a gratuitous insult.
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under the will, striking out the fraudulently procured codicil would not
affect him directly, although his wife would of course receive a lesser
amount. If the tort action were allowed, plaintiff might get punitive dam-
ages 18 from the husband and from his wife as well, in addition to regaining
the original sum she would have received from the will. It is not clear
whether plaintiff could, after winning in probate proceedings, sue in tort
for punitive damages. Probate court could not grant punitive damages. An
Ohio decision has allowed recovery in tort for the additional expense of
proving a will in probate caused by defendant's wrongful suppression.19
But if additional damages are to be permitted, it seems advisable in the
interest of avoiding a multiplicity of actions to confer upon probate
court the power to dispense them.20
18. In Pennsylvania, punitive or exemplary damages are recoverable in an action
for deceit only when extreme aggravation occurs. Long v. McAllister, 275 Pa. 34,
118 Atl. 506 (1922).
19. Taylor v. Bennett, 1 Ohio C.C. 95 (1885).
20. At the present time it appears that plaintiff will take an appeal from probate,
since the statute of limitations has not yet run, even though a year has passed while
the tort issue was being litigated. Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 21, 1953, p. 26, col. 2.
Plaintiff has also commenced an action in Florida against the husband for slander.
Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 7, 1953, p. 4, col. 6.
